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Refusing medical treatment after attempted
suicide: Rethinking capacity and coercive
treatment in light of the Kerrie Wooltorton case
Sascha Callaghan and Christopher James Ryan*
The inquest into the death of Kerrie Wooltorton in Norfolk, England, ignited
extensive public debate on the scope of the common law right to refuse
medical treatment where a patient is distressed, depressed or actively
suicidal. In Australia, a patient’s wishes need not be honoured if the patient is
not legally competent, if he or she falls within the ambit of the compulsory
treatment provisions in the mental health legislation, and possibly also if there
is a recognised public interest in preventing suicide which is sufficient to
override the patient’s choice. This article argues that decisions about whether
to give medical treatment despite an apparent refusal should be based solely
on a determination of the patient’s competence to make their own choice.
However, the test for legal competence must take into account the person’s
agency in making the decision, and decisions which will effectively end the
person’s life must be shown to be thought through.
INTRODUCTION
On 17 September 2007, a 26-year-old woman named Kerrie Wooltorton consumed several glasses of
antifreeze in a suicide attempt and called an ambulance. She carried a letter informing doctors that she
knew the consequences of her actions, wanted no life-saving treatment, and had come to hospital only
so that she could be made comfortable and because she did not want to die alone. The letter is set out
in full below.
To whom this may concern, if I come into hospital regarding taking an overdose or any attempt of my
life, I would like for NO lifesaving treatment to be given. I would appreciate if you could continue to
give medicines to help relieve my discomfort, painkillers, oxygen etc. I would hope these wishes will be
carried out without loads of questioning.
Please be assured that I am 100% aware of the consequences of this and the probable outcome of
drinking anti-freeze, eg death in 95-99% of cases and if I survive then kidney failure, I understand and
accept them and will take 100% responsibility for this decision.
I am aware that you may think that because I call the ambulance I therefore want treatment. THIS IS
NOT THE CASE! I do however want to be comfortable as nobody want to die alone and scared and
without going into details there are loads of reasons I do not want to die at home which I realise that
you will not understand and I apologise for this.
Please understand that I definitely don’t want any form of Ventilation, resuscitation or dialysis, these are
my wishes, please respect and carry them out.
When questioned by doctors following her admission, Kerrie said simply: “It’s in the letter, it says
what I want.”
The treating doctors consulted widely and sought legal advice. They took the view that Kerrie
was competent to refuse treatment and, on this basis, believed they were obliged to act in accordance
* Sascha Callaghan, BEc (Soc Sci), LLB (Hons), M Bioethics, Doctoral Scholar, Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in
Medicine, University of Sydney; Christopher James Ryan, MBBS, FRANZCP, Consultation-Liaison Psychiatrist, Westmead
Hospital, Westmead, New South Wales, and Senior Clinical Lecturer, Discipline of Psychiatry and the Centre for Values, Ethics
and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney.
Correspondence to: sascha.callaghan@sydney.edu.au.
(2011) 18 JLM 811 811
with her wishes. She died in hospital two days later.1 Late in 2009, the Norfolk coroner endorsed the
doctors’ decision, prompting widespread comment in the media and calls for a review of English law.2
The outcome of the Wooltorton case reflects the well-established principle that lawful medical
treatment requires patient consent, and that medical treatment may be refused by a competent person
even where, without treatment, the person will likely die.3 However, the common law right to
autonomy in making medical decisions is not unassailable, and in Australia, competent people who
refuse medical treatment may be coercively treated in one of two ways.
First, competent patients who nonetheless fall within the terms of Australia’s mental health
legislation may be involuntarily treated once that person is deemed to be mentally ill and at risk of
serious physical harm. It is likely that should Kerrie Wooltorton have presented to an Australian
hospital in the same circumstances as she did in Norfolk, she could have been involuntarily treated
under Australian mental health laws.4
Secondly, there is a recognised public interest in preserving life and preventing suicide at
common law, which might also operate to override a competent refusal of medical treatment in some
circumstances.
A commonly expressed view in the wake of the Wooltorton inquest is that the ability to coercively
treat some competent patients is a good thing, and that mental health legislation, in particular, provides
an important humanitarian safeguard against the self-harming actions of depressed people, competent
or otherwise. However, if personal autonomy remains a fundamental and long-held right in relation to
the provision of medical treatment, the rationale for any involuntary medical intervention deserves
careful scrutiny.
These two ethical imperatives – the right of patients to autonomous choice and the need to protect
vulnerable people – often pull in opposite directions. This article argues that, when considering
whether to give effect to refusal of medical treatment after a suicide attempt, the way the law currently
balances these competing pressures is inadequate, often leading to unpredictable and discriminatory
outcomes. It suggests both that patients’ rights to autonomy and the need to protect vulnerable people
will best be served by a renewed focus on competence, but that, in addition to the usual rules for
assessing competence, treating clinicians must be satisfied that patients’ refusals of life-saving
treatment are well considered and that attention should be given to the extent to which the decision is
consistent with the patient’s sustained values and desires. The authors argue that this approach is both
fairer and more effective than the current legal approaches that either rely on a diagnosis of mental
illness or disorder regardless of competence, or require problematic distinctions to be drawn between
refusals of medical treatment which might be “suicidal” and those which are not.
AUTONOMY, COMPETENCE AND REFUSALS OF TREATMENT
It is broadly accepted that people should be allowed to make decisions about their lives based on their
own beliefs and values, provided that those decisions do not significantly disadvantage others. In the
ethics literature this is known as the principle of “respect for autonomy”.5
1 Inquest into the Death of Kerrie Wooltorton (unrep, Norfolk County Coroner’s Court, Armstrong J, 28 September 2009).
2 Gabbatt A, “Doctors Acted Legally in ‘Living Will’ Suicide Case”, The Guardian (1 October 2009), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/01/living-will-suicide-legal viewed 14 December 2010; Bingham J, “Bishops: Legal
Rules Could Prevent Repeat of Kerrie Wooltorton ‘Living Will’ Suicide”, The Telegraph (6 October 2009), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/religion/6265722/Bishops-legal-rules-could-prevent-repeat-of-
Kerrie-Wooltorton-living-will-suicide.html viewed 14 December 2010; Smith R, Laing A and Devlin K, “Doctors Feared
Saving Suicidal Young Woman”, Sydney Morning Herald (2 October 2009).
3 See Freckelton I, “Patients’ Decisions to Die: The Emerging Australian Jurisprudence” (2011) 18 JLM 427.
4 For example, Ryan C and Callaghan S, “Legal and Ethical Aspects of Refusing Medical Treatment After a Suicide Attempt:
The Wooltorton Case in the Australian Context” (2010) 193 MJA 239; Storm V, “Despair Is Not the End of the Road but the
Beginning”, Sydney Morning Herald (5 October 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/contributors/despair-is-not-the-end-of-
the-road-but-the-beginning-20091004-ghu5.html viewed 14 December 2010.
5 Beauchamp T and Childress J, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) p 99.
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The work of John Stuart Mill had a major influence on the development of this principle in liberal
political theory, and on English common law in relation to a patient’s right to refuse medical
treatment. Mill’s “liberty principle” states:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good … is not a sufficient warrant.
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right … In
the part [of a person’s conduct] which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.6
This principle is directly reflected in a well-established line of legal authority which provides that a
competent person may refuse medical treatment for any reason, even if it will likely lead to the
person’s own death or serious injury.7 Providing medical treatment without consent, or despite a
competent refusal, is a trespass at common law.8
In order to make an autonomous decision, an individual must have capacity – that is, the person’s
ability to make a decision must meet a certain minimum standard. If a person lacks capacity, their
decision may be overridden as it will not be taken to reflect a genuine free choice. A person who lacks
capacity may be treated by doctors according to a clinical assessment of the person’s best interests,
notwithstanding the stated refusal of medical treatment.9 Guardianship laws provide for consent to be
given by a substitute decision-maker in the same circumstances.
There are many ways in which a person’s capacity might be assessed and many standards of
competence to which a person might be held. The prevailing common law test takes a “functional”
approach to competence, in that it focuses on whether a person can demonstrate threshold
decision-making ability, rather than the content of the decision (an “outcomes” approach) or whether
the decision-maker is one of a class of persons who are deemed to be incompetent (a “status”
approach).10 Functional tests for capacity are often regarded as fairer and more supportive of patient
autonomy than outcomes or status-based methods, which involve an objective evaluation of the
content of the patient’s decision or the characteristics of the decision-maker rather than permitting all
persons who are able to make decisions to do so according to their own values.11 While the common
law test has been expressed in various ways, generally speaking a person will be taken to be
competent to refuse medical treatment if the person is able to
• understand and retain treatment information;
6 Mill JS, “On Liberty” in Ryan A (ed), On Liberty and the Subjugation of Women (Penguin, London, 2006) p 16.
7 That principle has been established by decisions in each of the major common law jurisdictions, including the United States
(Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92 at 93 (1914); Bouvia v Superior Court 179 Cal App 3d 1127 at 1137,
1139-1141 (1986)); Canada (Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385; Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR
(4th) 321 at 328); the United Kingdom (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 857 (Lord Keith), at 864 (Lord Goff); B
v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] 2 All ER 449 at [16]-[21]); New Zealand (Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General
[1993] 1 NZLR 235 at 245); and Australia (Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009]
NSWSC 761 at [9]-[15]; Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 at [26]; H Ltd v J (2010) 107 SASR 352; [2010]
SASC 176 at [33]-[46]).
8 Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321 at 328; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB
and SMB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218; Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761 at
[9]-[15].
9 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 103 (Donaldson LJ) cited with approval in Hunter and New
England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009] NSWSC 761 at [31]-[34].
10 Stewart C and Biegler P, “A Primer on the Law of Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment” (2004) 78 ALJ 325.
11 See eg Stewart and Biegler, n 10 at 326; New South Wales Parliament, Legislative Council, Standing Committee on Social
Issues, “Substitute Decision-making for People Lacking Capacity”, Report 43 (February 2010) pp 30-32. http://
www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/e00602d3c8f39ca5ca2576d500184231/$FILE/
100225%20SDM%20Final%20Report.pdf viewed 14 December 2010.
Refusing medical treatment after attempted suicide
(2011) 18 JLM 811 813
• use and weigh the information among other factors and reach a decision;12 and
• communicate that decision by some means.
A competent decision to refuse medical treatment does not have to be sensible or well considered
in the opinion of others.13 A valid refusal may be thought to be foolish or mistaken14 and the reasons
given by a competent person may be rational or irrational, unknown or even non-existent.15 Having an
active mental illness will not necessarily preclude a finding of competence, provided the effects of the
illness do not directly impact the person’s ability to make the decision in question.16
The outcome of a decision does not, in itself, preclude a finding of competence and is relevant
only as evidence as to whether the person meets the requirements of the functional test. Consequently,
a competent refusal of medical treatment will be valid even if it will likely lead to the person’s own
death or serious injury.17
Kerrie Wooltorton was found by her treating doctors, and later by the coroner, to be competent to
refuse life-saving treatment. However, if she had been found to lack capacity to make her decision, in
Norfolk Hospital, or any hospital in Australia, she could lawfully have been treated back to health.
IRRATIONALITY AND DISTRESS: COERCIVE TREATMENT UNDER THE MENTAL
HEALTH ACTS
Despite the common law’s insistence on the rights of competent people, in Australia a person who
falls within the terms of the applicable mental health legislation18 (referred to here as the “Mental
Health Acts”) may be given treatment without consent if the person is mentally unwell as defined by
the Act, if the person is considered likely to come to some harm as a result of her or his condition, and
if the treatment is “the least restrictive” option. In each jurisdiction, definitions of mental unwellness –
variously termed mental “illness” or “disorder” or “disturbance” or “dysfunction” – differ slightly, but
all would be likely to cover a person presenting with a clinical diagnosis of reactive depression or
adjustment disorder as well as a more serious major depression or psychosis. The issue is not per se
whether a depressed, distressed or suicidal person like Kerrie Wooltorton is competent in common law
terms to refuse medical treatment – and it is possible that they will be – as the person’s competence is
not a factor to be taken into account in determining whether involuntary treatment should be given. As
a consequence, some people will be detained and treated notwithstanding what has the potential to be
a competent refusal of medical care.
12 Re MB (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541 at 553-554 (Butler-Sloss LJ), cited with approval in Hunter and New
England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009] NSWSC 761 at [25]; Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter
[2009] WASC 229 at [13].
13 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 116 (Butler-Sloss LJ), cited with approval in Hunter and New
England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009] NSWSC 761 at [10].
14 In Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321 at 328 (Robins JA), cited with approval in Hunter and New England Area
Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009] NSWSC 761 at [14].
15 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 113 (Butler-Sloss LJ), cited with approval in Hunter and New
England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009] NSWSC 761 at [15] and Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter
[2009] WASC 229 at [27]. However, in Hunter, McDougall J noted (at [15]) that “the lack of any discernible basis for a
decision to refuse treatment may be something to take into account in assessing the competence or validity of the decision”.
16 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819.
17 See n 7.
18 Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT); Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW); Mental Health and Related Services
Act (NT); Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld); Mental Health Act 2009 (SA); Mental Health Act 1996 (Tas); Mental Health Act 1986
(Vic); Mental Health Act 1996 (WA).
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A person like Kerrie Wooltorton, who had a history of depression and suicide attempts,19 would
probably have met the criteria for coercive treatment under all of the Australian Mental Health Acts.20
However, if autonomy is an important right for all citizens, and people are generally permitted to
refuse medical treatment – even if to do so would allow their inevitable death – there is reason to
consider whether the operation of the Acts in this way really represents good public policy. The
concern is that, by determining whether to honour a patient’s wishes on the basis of the person’s
mental health status rather than on whether they are able to make a true decision for themselves, the
Mental Heath Acts may represent unjustified discrimination against a class of competent people who
happen to receive a diagnosis of mental illness. The authors return to this issue, and a possible
alternative approach, later in the article.
LIMITS TO AUTONOMY: PUBLIC INTERESTS IN THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE?
There is also an argument that, competence aside, there may be limits to the principle of autonomy,
even where it is restricted to what Mill called “the part [of a person’s conduct] which merely concerns
himself”.21 In other words, there may be some types of decisions to die that should simply not be
allowed under any circumstances. It has already been established that there is a right to succumb to
illness or injury without medical treatment, no matter how dire the patient’s condition. But is there a
discernible difference between “succumbing” and the wilful infliction of injury on one’s self, which is
sufficient to exclude an enforceable right to the latter – even where people are competent?
As it stands, the law in relation to self-harm depends a lot on context. While suicide itself is not
illegal, the common law recognises a public interest in preserving life and preventing suicide22 which
may, on occasion, need to be weighed against the right to autonomy in making medical decisions. If
the balance is tipped in favour of preserving life, a competent person who does not fall within the
ambit of the Mental Health Acts may, at least in theory, be treated against their will at common law.
Assisting suicide also remains a criminal offence in all Australian jurisdictions,23 and some
jurisdictions offer a statutory defence for any person who uses force to prevent a suicide.24
In medical treatment cases, however, this type of “outcomes” approach is problematic because it
is not always easy to explain the difference between what should count as “suicide” – which must be
19 Kerrie Wooltorton’s depression and extensive history of self-harming behaviour is detailed in David A, Hotopf M, Moran P,
Owen G, Szmukler G and Richardson G, “Mentally Disordered or Lacking Capacity? Lessons for Management of Serious
Deliberate Self Harm” (2010) 241 BMJ c4489.
20 The degree of certainty with which non-psychiatric treatment can be given without consent to patients who are admitted to
hospital under the involuntary treatment provisions of the Mental Health Acts (see n 18), varies in each jurisdiction. Victoria
(Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic),s 84(3)), the Australian Capital Territory (Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT),
s 44(1)(c)), South Australia (Mental Health Act 1993 (SA), s 18(1)), Western Australia (Mental Health Act 1996 (WA), s 110)
and the Northern Territory (Mental Health and Related Services Act 1988 (NT), s 63) expressly permit urgent life-saving
treatment. In New South Wales the law is not explicit but an authorised medical officer is permitted to give “any treatment
(including any medication) the officer thinks fit” to an involuntary patient (s 84). Section 18(2) also states that a person may be
detained and treated under the Act for “a condition or illness other than a mental illness or other mental condition”. The warrant
for non-psychiatric treatment is even less clear in Queensland, although urgent life-saving treatment is not one of the specially
regulated treatments in the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) which require patient consent. It would be reasonable to conclude that
provisions in Queensland which permit non-voluntary treatment for mental illness or disorder would include treatment of the
physical consequences of self-harm which arise from the illness or disorder. This was the conclusion reached in relation to
similar provisions in the Mental Health Act 1983 (UK) in B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] 2 WLR 294.
21 Mill, n 6, p 16.
22 For example, “the interest of the state in … preventing suicide” was acknowledged but excluded from consideration in Re T
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 117 (Butler-Sloss LJ). For further discussion, see Stewart C, “Public
Interests and the Right to Die: Compelling Reasons for Overriding the Right to Refuse Treatment” (2001) 14 Australian
Institute of Health Law and Ethics Issues Papers 1.
23 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 17; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 31C; Criminal Code (NT), s 168; Criminal Code (Qld), s 311;
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 13A(5); Criminal Code (Tas), s 163; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 6B(2); Criminal
Code (WA), s 288.
24 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 18; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 574B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 13; Crimes
Act 1958 (Vic), s 463B.
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prevented – and what is merely a lawful refusal of treatment, albeit one which will inevitably lead to
the patient’s death, which must be upheld. Certainly, each of the two legal approaches to this question
– ascertaining whether patient has a suicidal motive,25 and determining whether the cause of death is
“natural”26 – has been heavily criticised,27 and has generated haphazard and unpredictable results.
For example, in most medical treatment cases which have considered the question of “suicidal
motive” – that is, whether the patient has an active wish to die which should be honoured – the court
has determined that a patient who accepts death as the preferable alternative to the continuation of
overly burdensome medical treatment, at least where there is no hope of cure, cannot be said to want
to die. Rather, these people are taken to just really not want medical treatment – and that death is
merely the necessary and preferable alternative to continuing with it.28
Conversely, in at least one case from the United States, a 28-year-old quadriplegic patient who
was found to have “formed an intent to die” was denied an application to refuse medical treatment.29
This can be contrasted with the recent Western Australian case of Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter
[2009] WASC 229, where a hospital sought orders as to whether a patient’s direction to withdraw
artificial feeding and hydration was lawful. The court acknowledged that the patient was not
terminally ill or dying but that he “wish[ed] to die … However, because of the physical limitation
upon his movements [due to his quadriplegia] he lack[ed] the physical capacity to bring about his own
death” (at [11]). Notwithstanding the acknowledged suicidal motive, however, the court held that a
competent direction by Mr Rossiter to refuse treatment would be lawful and the hospital would be
legally required to cease treatment.
The second approach to distinguishing treatment refusals from suicide involves the frequently
criticised30 legal distinction between acts and omissions. This approach maintains that a person who
refuses medical treatment, or who dies after life-saving treatment is withdrawn, does not die from an
act of suicide but rather from the underlying medical condition which has been permitted to take its
natural course (by the omission to provide medical treatment).31 It is difficult to say, however, without
direct precedent, how this reasoning would be applied to a case where the fatal underlying condition
was self-inflicted – such as kidney failure after drinking poison.
None of these issues was considered by the coroner in the Wooltorton case. However, on balance,
it appears that the lawfulness of a refusal of medical treatment may be in doubt where, without
treatment, the patient will die from the effects of a deliberate, self-inflicted injury, but probably not if
25 For discussion of suicidal motive in a medical treatment case, see Bouvia v Superior Court 179 Cal App 3d 1127 (1986).
Also, regarding intention to suicide generally, see Schneidas v Corrective Services Commission (unrep, Sup Ct, NSW, 8 April
1983) where force feeding of a hunger-striking prisoner was permitted on the basis that his refusal of food amounted to
attempted suicide. Also see Re Caulk 480 A 2d 93 at 96-97 (1984).
26 See eg Re Conroy 486 A 2d 1209 (1985); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz 370 NE 2d 417 (1977).
27 Stewart, n 22; Price D, “Assisted Suicide and Refusing Medical Treatment: Linguistics, Morals and Legal Contortions”
(1996) 4 Med L Rev 270; Lanham D, Taming Death by Law (Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993).
28 For example, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz 370 NE 2d 417 (1977); Re T (Adult: Refusal of
Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 102 (Donaldson LJ): “This appeal is not in truth about the ‘right to die’. There is no
suggestion that Miss T wants to die. I do not doubt that she wants to live and we all hope that she will. This appeal is about the
‘right to choose how to live’. This is quite different, even if the choice, when made, may make an early death more likely.”
29 This was the finding at trial; however, on appeal, it was determined that motive was not relevant to the question of whether
the patient had validly refused medical treatment: Bouvia v Superior Court 179 Cal App 3d 1127 (1986).
30 For example, concerns about the distinction between acts and omissions were discussed in detail in Airedale NHS Trust v
Bland [1993] AC 789 in relation to whether withdrawal of treatment leading to death could be said to “cause” death.
Browne-Wilkinson LJ acknowledged (at 885) that the acts/omissions distinction in relation to killing/letting die “will appear to
some to be almost irrational … [b]ut it is undoubtedly the law”. Mustill LJ was also highly critical, commenting (at 893) that
“the current state of the law is unsatisfactory both morally and intellectually … We cannot however try to put it in order here.
For the time being all are agreed that the distinction between acts and omissions exists, and that we must give effect to it.”
31 The acts/omissions distinction in withdrawal of medical treatment is discussed in detail in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]
AC 789: see eg Goff LJ (at 866): “[T]he doctor, in discontinuing life support, is simply allowing his patient to die of his
pre-existing condition.” For discussion, see Williams G, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-killing (Routledge Cavendish,
Abingdon, 2007).
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a competent person (who is not subject to a regime of involuntary treatment) refuses medical
treatment for any other type of illness or injury. It may also be in doubt if the person appears to be
suicidal, but not if he or she is suicidal and suffering from a debilitating and incurable condition.
The reason for the apparent inconsistency and, some would say, unfairness in the case law on
refusal of medical treatment seems to be that the law is really interested in preventing what some
authors have called “irrational”32 or “unjustifiable”33 self-destruction, but the strictures of common
law principle prevent this from being clearly articulated, and prevent the dividing line between
acceptable refusals of medical treatment and unacceptable “suicides” from being clearly drawn.
Without addressing head-on the issue of exactly which refusals of treatment should be rejected, and
why, results will continue to be unpredictable and the rights of patients and the role of doctors will
remain in doubt in refusal of treatment cases.
COMPETENCE AND AGENCY: A BETTER ALTERNATIVE?
If it seems arbitrary to override the right to self-determination based on the cause of the presenting
injury; inconsistent to consider patients’ “motives” in some cases but not in others; and discriminatory
to override competent decisions on the basis of a person’s mental health status, the authors suggest
that the better approach is to reconsider the capacity requirements for a refusal of medical treatment –
and to permit autonomous choices where a person, self-harming or succumbing, mentally ill or
otherwise, fulfils these capacity criteria and makes a clear choice. The authors believe that this
approach preserves the well-established right to self-determination in decisions about medical
treatment, while adequately serving legitimate policy goals that require vulnerable people in the
community to be protected.
In particular, it is suggested that a refusal of medical treatment, where the refusal will lead to the
patient’s death, should be considered valid and enforceable if it satisfies the following criteria:
• the decision-maker must be competent according to the usual function-based rules applying to
refusals of medical treatment;
• the degree to which the person’s decision is consistent with their stable and enduring desires must
be considered when determining whether the person is able to “use and weigh information” about
the consequences of a treatment decision; and
• the person must demonstrate that their decision is well considered.34
The “agency” requirement
The requirement that, in assessing competence, consideration should be given to the degree to which
the person’s expressed desire is consistent with stable and enduring desires, underlines the notion that,
generally speaking, a person will tend to make decisions that are consistent over time. It also accords
with the notion of agency, a crucial component of autonomy, which refers to a person’s awareness of
their goals.35 When a person makes an important decision (such as the refusal of life-saving treatment)
that is radically at odds with her or his previously held views, there is reason to suspect that the person
may temporarily lack the capacity to make that decision and may come to regret that decision within
a short period of time. While this requirement does mean that the outcome of a decision – that is,
whether the decision is consistent with the person’s usual life views – is relevant in determining
competence, it is limited to being an indicator of functional competence rather than being
32 Otlowski M, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p 74.
33 Price, n 27 at 289-292.
34 Stewart C, Peisah C and Draper B, “A Test for Mental Capacity to Request Assisted Suicide” (2010) J Med Ethics,
http://www.jme.bmj.com/content/early/2010/11/21/jme.2010.037564.full viewed 14 December 2010. Stewart et al argue that a
legal test for competence to request assisted suicide should require that patients be able to demonstrate an ability to understand
detailed information about their illness and the consequences of treatment or withdrawal of treatment intended to cause death. It
is not clear whether the authors believe that patients should demonstrate that they have actually understood this information, but
in practical terms, an ability to understand would presumably be best demonstrated by actual understanding. The authors also
say that “the decision should be consistent over time with past expressed wishes and beliefs”.
35 Richardson G, “Autonomy, Guardianship and Mental Disorder: One Problem, Two Solutions” (2002) 65 Mod L Rev 702.
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determinative of it. This means that a person may be found to have competently changed their mind
from their “usual views”, but acknowledges, quite properly, that people who make decisions in
situations of high emotional stress that are inconsistent with their usual life views are often, on closer
inspection, functionally incompetent to make the decision in question. Medical professionals have a
responsibility to identify these individuals and to treat them in their best interests should they be found
to lack capacity to decide for themselves.
Why should “decisions to die” be well considered?
At common law, a refusal of medical treatment by a competent person need not, strictly speaking, be
well considered. It has been said that a decision to refuse medical treatment, even one leading to the
patient’s death, will be valid even if the reasons given are “irrational, unknown or even
non-existent”36 and, while courts have acknowledged that “the lack of any discernible basis for a
decision to refuse treatment may be something to take into account in assessing the competence or
validity of the decision”,37 there has been no clear insistence that competence in life-and-death
decisions requires a deal of thinking through. Indeed, approaches to competence which focus on the
nature and quality of a decision, which might include whether the decision is well made by objective
standards, have been criticised as unfairly limiting the established right at common law for competent
people to make any type of decision they wish.38
However, there are good policy reasons why hospitals and treating clinicians should take
reasonable steps to assure themselves that a patient’s decision to die has been thought through before
acting on it. Not least of these is that the decision to die is drastic and fundamentally irrevocable,
Those with the ability, and perhaps the duty, to prevent a person’s death should be confident that a
person is sure about what they want before withholding or withdrawing critical assistance. A
requirement that a person who has capacity should have demonstrably applied their reasoning ability
to the question at hand, is not an unfairly limiting requirement when balanced against the public
interest in preventing death – at least in circumstances where a decision to die may not be a genuine
choice made with the fully engaged decision-making capacity of a competent person.
WHAT MIGHT THIS HAVE MEANT FOR KERRIE WOOLTORTON?
Kerrie Wooltorton did not usually want to die. She had attempted suicide before, but after her previous
suicide attempts she had received treatment and had apparently decided, at least for a time, to get on
with life. A thorough consideration of whether Kerrie Wooltorton’s agency was fully engaged may
have raised doubts about her competence.39
Just this sort of concern has troubled judges in other cases. For example, in the leading judgment
in B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] 2 WLR 294 Hoffmann LJ noted his discomfort with the trial
judge’s finding that a young woman with borderline personality disorder, whose symptoms included a
chronic compulsion to self-harm, had capacity at common law to refuse artificial feeding during a
life-threatening period of anorexia. Referring to the young woman’s testimony, Hoffmann LJ said (at
300):
I find it hard to accept that someone who acknowledges that in refusing food at the critical time she did
not appreciate the extent to which she was hazarding her life, was crying inside for help but unable to
break out of the routine of punishing herself, could be said to be capable of making a true choice as to
whether or not to eat.
At the time of her review, Kerrie Wooltorton was not asked, and possibly was unable to answer,
the sorts of questions that might have allowed assessment of whether she had the capacity required to
36 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 103 (Donaldson LJ).
37 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88; [2009] NSWSC 761 at [15].
38 See eg New South Wales Parliament, Legislative Council, Standing Committee on Social Issues, n 11, pp 30-32. The Standing
Committee endorsed a “functional approach” over a “status” or an “outcomes” approach to capacity testing which, according to
a submission by Blake Dawson Lawyers (quoted at [4.41]), “considers the result or quality of a decision rather than the person’s
capacity to make the decision”.
39 David et al, n 19, also raise questions about the limitations of the capacity assessment made in relation to Kerrie Wooltorton.
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make a decision both with serious consequences and apparently counter to her usual desires. Were
things different this time? Why? How long had things been different? Why had she called the
ambulance, presumably knowing that in all likelihood she would be treated against her will? Why was
it so important that she not die alone that she would risk almost certainly not dying at all?
It is possible to imagine a range of answers that Kerrie might have given to these questions that
would have reassured her doctors that her decision to die was truly autonomous. Unfortunately
though, the law has not been articulated so as to clearly require her to be asked those kinds of
questions, so one cannot know what impact her answers may have had on the assessment of her
competence.
CONCLUSION
Most people who present in a manner similar to that of Kerrie Wooltorton will not have made a
considered decision to die that carries forward their agency. For most, the attempt will be impulsive
and a suicide note, including one refusing treatment, will be written in the context of that impulsive
decision. In such cases, unless the person can clearly demonstrate functional competence and that their
decision has been thought through, they deserve treatment in their best interests – as is the right of all
people who lack capacity to make their own medical decisions.
However, where a person is found to be competent, and to have arrived at a critical decision to
refuse life-saving treatment after genuine consideration, the person’s decision should be honoured,
whether or not the person has a mental illness, or whether the decision can be characterised as
“suicide” or the process of allowing one’s self to die from other causes.
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